Abstract

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According to a long-standing tradition of philosophical thought that reaches back to Descartes, non-human animals’ lack of language evidences their lack of (rational) minds. Descartes acknowledged that animals communicate their ‘passions’ via signs; but he inferred from the absence of verbal expression that animals are incapable of thought. Along the same lines Donald Davidson, a leading figure of 20th century analytic philosophy, argued that rationality is the privilege of language-endowed humans.

In my presentation I critically assess these traditional arguments in the light of recent developments in both the scientific study of non-human animal cognition and its philosophical reflection. Evolutionary biology suggests mental continuity between animals and humans, and so does recent research in minimal cognition and embodied cognition. Philosophically, we may conclude that there is thinking without language or, alternatively, that we ought to widen our notion of language to encompass various forms of animal communication. Discussing these options also serves to highlight some of the key questions of the philosophy of language and their wider impact on other fields of research in philosophy and beyond.